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Abstract
Recently cyber-attacks become serious threats even for control systems. For process control, not only security but also 
safety must be assured. For safety assurance, the effects of cyber-attacks such as concealed remote operation and 
maneuvering must be evaluated. We proposed a securing method to divide field networks into plural zones. Even when a 
zone is intruded and attacks are concealed, the effects appear in other zones. In this paper, an automatic cyber-attacks 
detection system using PCA (Principal Component Analysis) is proposed. There are many kinds of relationships among 
variables included plural zones. Cyber-attacks change some of them. PCA is effective to detect the changes.
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1. Introduction
Recently cyber-attacks become serious threats even for control systems. In 2010, an epoch making malware,
Stuxnet, was discovered. It was a virus targeting centrifuge controllers in the Iran nuclear fuel factory. After its
discovery subspecies have been developed. Although Stuxnet had a specific target, indiscriminate attacks can
be committed by them. When control systems are intruded, not only their dysfunction but also serious accidents
such as explosion or spill of dangerous substances might occur. Industrial control systems (ICS) require highly 
reliable security and safety services with urgent priority.
In information networks security measures are frequently taken. Databases of anti-virus software are 
updated every day. Various security patches are sent from product developers almost every day. However, in
control networks anti-virus software is not utilized or security patches are not applied. Because they increase 
computation load and change link libraries, they might make controllers stop or be in ill conditions.
Therefore, vulnerability of control networks is much less than one of information networks.
Even in information networks, successes of cyber-attacks are reported frequently. The relationship of 
cyber-attacks and security measures is a cat-and-mouse game. In order to assure the safety of ICS against 
cyber-attacks, the relationships between safety and cyber-security must be considered and the characteristics of 
the plant must be taken advantages to develop security measures.
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Accidents can be analyzed in the viewpoints of material, equipment and procedures. The seriousness of the 
effects of cyber-attacks such as remote operation and concealment can be evaluated via safety assessment. 
Zone division is designed to decrease it [1-4].
Many kinds of relationships must be observed to detect the concealed cyber-attacks. It is impossible for 
operators to care the all possibility. We propose automatic detection system using principal component analysis
(PCA) in this study.
The variables which are monitored by PCA (Principal Component Analysis) are selected considering zones.
In order to illustrate the scheme, a simple plant is utilized. In the next section the plant is explained.
2. Sample System for Discussion
Figure 1 shows a simple plant in which hot water is circulated between two tanks. It can be regarded as an
example of integrated plants. For each tank, SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) and 
operators are assigned. If some trouble occurs in one of the tanks, the effects appear in the other tank.
LM1 and LM2 are level sensors. TM1 and TM2 are thermometers. PM is a pressure sensor. FM is a flow 
meter. The valve 1 and 2 are automatic valves and valve 3 is a manual valve. Valve 4 serves as a safety valve. 
H is heater. There are three controllers. FC, LC1 and TC1. Figure 2 shows the picture of the experimental plant.
Fig. 1. Example system
3. Network configuration of Experimental Plant
The control networks are divided into two zones. Each zone has an OPC (OLE for Process Control) server 
and SCADA. SCADAs correspond to the observed areas by operators. It is normal that the zones correspond to
the observed areas by operators. However, the control network zones are nested. The information contained in 
the other zone is necessary for SCADA. Another OPC server is utilized in the upper network as shown in
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Figure 3. Every data of each zone is collected by its OPC server and is sent to OPC server in the upper network.
Any data can be copied from the upper OPC server. If another zone is intruded, the copied data might be 
inaccurate. Inconsistency might be able to be detected by observing the plural zones. Its detection must be
carried out not by operators but by computers. The detection system should be assigned in every zone. When
abnormality is detected in the zone which survived from cyber-attacks, the alarm corresponding to the 
inconsistency is sent to the operators. PCA is applicable to detect abnormality. By combining zone division and 
PCA the inconsistency caused by cyber-attacks might be detected. The procedure is explained in the fourth
section.
Fig. 2. Pictures of the equipment
Fig. 3 Zone configuration of control network
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4. Safety Analysis considering Cyber Attacks 
 
Cyber-security problems were information leakage or falsification. However, for ICS accidents caused by 
remote operation and concealment are serious problems. Safety assurance is the most important for ICS. 
Therefore, how the safety is collapsed by cyber-attacks must be analyzed. Because new kinds of cyber-attacks 
will be developed, safety measures cannot be discussed based on the cyber-attack procedures. However, safety 
can be analyzed based on the plant and networks.  
Figure 4 shows the fault tree whose top event is “Fire or breakage of tank1 heater”. To improve safety the 
condition of AND gates are important. If the prevention of one of the conditions is succeeded, the accident can 
be avoided. To achieve fire or breakage of the heater, continuity of heating until temperature is increased to the 
dangerous point is necessary. To prevent detection of overheat before fire or breakage of the heater,   
concealment is necessary for cyber-attackers. To achieve overheat making the heater on and making the tank 
empty are necessary. If the temperature controller and level controller of tank1 are divided into other zones, 
concealment and remote operation of the both controllers become difficult. 
Zone division can be designed based on FTA and its effectiveness can be evaluated using FTA. 
Plants usually have many control loops and sensors.  There might be huge number of variation of their 
zone division. Therefore, computer aided design system is necessary for control network zone division. 
 
Fig. 4. Fault tree considering cyber-attacks 
 
5. Zone Design using Cause Effect matrices 
 
If the temperature sensors of the both tanks in Figure 1 are included in the identical zone and the zone is 
intruded, remote control and concealment of the temperature controllers cannot be detected. The zone division 
should be designed to make concealment difficult. 
A zone division design procedure using cause effect (CE) matrices were proposed [3]. The relationships 
between variables of the plant and the controller are expressed with Boolean matrices. 
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Figure 5 shows the CE matrix of the plant. The difference between the process variables and observed 
variables is generated by sensor trouble or concealment. The local manipulated variables, V3 and V4, are the 
actuators which cannot be operated by cyber-attackers. Binary manipulated variables, W, are the switch which 
can be changed via networks. Automatic manipulated variables, V1, V2 and H, are control valves which are 
remote operable. 
The ones (1) in Figure 5 show the relationships such that the control valve V1 can affect the flow rate F1 
and F1 can affect L2(the level of tank2), T2(temperature of the water of tank2), P(Pressure). 
 
Fig. 5. Matrix P (26x26) 
 
The relationships between PVs and MVs in controllers are indicated in Matric C shown in Table 2. Matrix 
C is a square matrix as large as Matrix P. All of its diagonal elements are 1. Figure 6 shows a part of Matrix 
C, which indicates the controller loop configuration such that F1 is PV and V1 is MV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. A part of Matrix C (26x26) 
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Concealment and remote operation are also expressed with Boolean matrices. When cyber-attacks are
succeeded in some zones, all variables in them can be concealed and manipulated variables and set-points can
be operated. Concealment matrix corresponds to zone division. Figure 7 shows the concealment matrix of 
zone2, S2. The observations of changes in zone 2 are deleted. Figure 8 shows the remote operation in zone 2,
M2. Figure 9 shows the observation in survival zones, O1.
Fig. 8. Remote operation matrix M2 (26x3).
Fig. 9. Survival matrix O1 (26x26)
Fig. 7. Concealment Matrix S2 (26x26)
Detectability matrix D12 shows the detectability of the cyber-attacks to zone 2 with the observation of zone 1.
It can be calculated with the following equation.
ܦଵଶሺ݊ሻ ൌ ଵܱ σሺܵଶ ή ܲ ή ܥሻ௡ ή ܵଶ ή ܲ ή ܯଶ                    (1)
The number in the brackets of detectability matrix shows the number of propagation stages. Although the 
quantitative time constants are not dealt with in Eq. (1), the number is a measure of propagation speed. 
Figure 10 shows that the remote operation of heater, H, can be concealed with the zone division, because the 
all elements of the column corresponding to H are zeros.
Fig. 11. False signal matrix A1 (26x3)
Fig. 10. Detectability Matrix ܦଵଶሺλሻ
The zone division is expressed as the entries of zeros in the diagonal elements
of concealment matrix, remote operation matrix and survival matrix. If the 
temperature sensor T1i is included in other zones, S2 is changed from Figure 7.
Then the detectability matrix in Figure 10 is changed. T1 appears as a row of D12
and the element corresponding to H and T1i becomes 1. It means that the remote
operation of TC1 (T2 is PV and H is MV) can be detected by observation of T1.
By using CE matrices P and C, the candidates of zone division can be generated   Fig. 12. Reachability matrix R1
automatically and its detectability can be judged.
CE matrices are also available to evaluate the effect of the impersonation. Although the real plant is normal,
false alarm might be generated. Operators or controller might generate unnecessary actions and it might cause
some troubles. The generation of false signals in zone 1 is illustrated by A1 in Figure 11. The effects of the false
signals to whole zones can be evaluated by calculating reachability matrix R1 in Figure 12.
ܴଵሺ݊ሻ ൌ σሺܲ ή ܥሻ௡ ܣଵ (2)
The seriousness of the effects is evaluated using FTA and the reachability matrix R1.      
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6. Detection of Abnormality
Although the calculation results of CE matrices show the detectability of remote operation and concealment,
how to detect them is another problem. Even if the relationships among the variables in the intruded zone look
normal, the effects of the remote operation appear in the survival zones. It causes inconsistency of the
relationships between the variables in the intruded zone and the survival one. Because there are many kinds of 
relationships among the variables, the identification of each relationships are very troublesome. 
In this paper, a procedure using principal component analysis (PCA) is proposed. To illustrate the principle 
of the method, data distribution of three variables is shown in Figure 13. If an equation is satisfied among three
variables, the freedom is two. In this case, the two top principal component scores have values. The last 
principal component score must be zero. All data are distributed on a hyper-plain. If some of relationships are 
changed, data might be generated outside the hyper-plain. It can be detected as the changes of the principal
component scores, which were zero. The principal component scores which were zero are sensitive to the 
changes of the relationships. Even for the cases in which the changes by cyber-attack maintain on the
hyper-plain, principal component scores are effective to detect the changes. PCA can express the distribution of 
normal data by choosing a suitable orthogonal coordinate. The rectangular ranges of the principal component 
scores distribution are more suitable to express the normal data distribution than the ones of the original
orthogonal coordinate of the sensed and actuated variables.
.
   
Fig. 13. Observation of changes based on PCA. Fig. 14. Cumulative contribution ratios of the
principal components for normal data
6.1. Example Scenarios of Cyber Attacks
We assume that the normal operation data have been logged. For a numerical example, experimental data 
including many kinds of set-point changes of level control and flow rate control were logged using the plant
shown in Fig. 2. To the data PCA had been applied and the principal components had been determined. The
cumulative contribution ratios of the principal components for the normal data are shown in Fig. 14. The top
four principal components can express almost all behaviors of the all of thirteen variables.
For monitoring the abnormality principal component scores are calculated online using the determined 
principal components.
There are many kinds of combination of different zone variables. Therefore, many monitoring systems can
be built. In this paper, the results using all of the thirteen process variables for PCA are shown for an example.
And two scenarios of cyber-attacks are shown to evaluate the detection capability of PCA. 
The first one is the detection of the remote operation and concealment by a cyber-attacker shown in Fig. 15.  
The set-point of the level of tank1 was decreased. The magnitude of the operation was popular and similar to
First component
Second component
Third component score is zero.
x1
x2
x3
f(x1, x2 , x3)=0
f’(x1, x2 , x3)=0
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data contained in the normal operation data. The attacker concealed the changes in the attacked zone. However, 
the changes in other zones were monitored. Therefore, the relationships between variables in other zones were
collapsed. The target of the first example is detection of the concealment.
Figure 17 shows the principal component scores for the monitored data in Figure 15. The two lines in each 
graph indicate the maximum and minimum scores for the learned normal data. The bands of the top three
principal component scores are wide and the next ten bands are very narrow compared to the three. The small
deviation of the principle component score means the existence of constraints among the thirteen variables.
Because the magnitude of the remote operation was not large, the changes in the top three scores were 
maintained in the band widths. However, the other scores departed from the upper or lower limits. These
changes can be regarded as the effects of the relationship change caused by concealment.
The next example is a large magnitude change by remote operation, which was not concealed. Figure 16
shows the changes in the levels of the two tanks. At time 360 Tank 1 became empty. Such situation was not 
included in the normal data. Figure 18 shows the principal component score changes corresponding to the 
changes in Figure 16.
Because the changes were not concealed, the relationships among the variables were not collapsed even after 
the attack, which caused at time 250. Therefore, the scores of the 4th and later principal components were
maintained in the bands of the normal data after time 250. At time 360, flow rate control was collapsed because 
Tank1 became empty. This collapse could be detected in these score changes.
The large magnitude change generated outer data from the normal data distribution bands in the top three 
principal components before time 360.
These results show that PCA is effective to detect abnormal situations.
PCA can be applied to any kinds of plants if normal operation data are available. Therefore, many 
abnormality detection systems can be constructed for real industrial plants.
It is still difficult to distinguish the causes of the abnormal situation as cyber-attack. However, the detection
is very important especially because concealment is included cyber-attack procedures.
The combination of zone division and automatic abnormal detection using PCA can be an effective security 
measure.
                                                     Fig. 16. Second example of cyber-attacks
Fig. 15. First example of cyber-attacks
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Fig. 17. A part of Principal component scores for a little manipulated and not concealed data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18. A part of Principal component scores for not concealed data 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, a design method of control network configuration to improve security and safety is proposed.  
The network is divided into plural zones. If the security of each zone is set independently, the possibility of the 
intrusion of the whole area becomes low. How to divide the network and how to detect the abnormality are 
discussed. Examples of application of zone division and PCA were illustrated. It was shown that the system 
could detect the relationship changes caused by concealment. 
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The proposed system is a just detection system of abnormality. The diagnosis of the cyber-attacks is a 
challenge in future.  For example, it is difficult to distinguish cyber-attack from the sensor failure of the tank2 
level using the data in Fig. 15. However, diagnosis cannot be started when detection was missed.  
PCA is just an example of abnormal detection methods. Many kinds of detection methods should be applied 
to secure control networks. 
Zone division is an example of the problems to which the process engineers should address proactively. It is 
eager that cyber-security will be improved by cooperation of information engineers and process engineers. 
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